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1. Introduction 
 Developing countries keen to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) have 
typically used various preferential tax policies to be competitive.  Tax holidays have been 
especially prevalent in the 1980s (Mintz [1990] and Shah [1995]) since they provide new 
foreign investors a low-tax regime for a qualifying period on the presumption that a 
company needs time to establish good levels of profitability. 
 With increased globalization, many developing countries have been incorporating 
new tax policies for multinationals to establish headquarter, financial and trading 
operations in their jurisdictions.  To attract FDI, while preserving revenue by countering 
efforts by multinationals to shift profits from high to low tax jurisdictions, many 
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countries have chosen low corporate income tax rates, low or no withholding taxes on 
income payments to non-residents, or low rates applied to income earned by holding 
companies.  These policies seem to have become common in the past ten years compared 
to traditional tax holidays incentives. 
 Picking the top 15 developing countries in terms of the FDI as a proportion of 
GDP for the 1997-2001 years, I examine their tax regimes to find that special 
“financing”1 regimes are commonplace or, alternatively, governments have dramatically 
lowered general corporate income and withholding tax rates to levels well below those 
typically found generally.  The incentives seem to work.  Leaving aside some countries 
with large natural resources (and therefore high rates of FDI), many developing countries 
with high levels of inbound investment and, in some instances relatively robust outbound 
investment rates, have attractive tax regimes with low rates, especially for finance or 
trading operations. 
 From an individual country’s perspective, the new tax policy regimes for FDI are 
less distorting that previous ones, especially compared to tax holidays, which are 
becoming somewhat less popular in some countries.  Certainly, only a few countries with 
the most significant levels of FDI use tax holidays – instead almost half have “financial” 
regimes that are highly attractive for multinational investment. 
 On the other hand, most countries with high degrees of FDI continue to rely on 
some fast writeoffs for capital costs such as accelerated depreciation and investment tax 
credits, even if corporate income tax rates are kept low.   
 Below, I shall first review the tax regimes of various developing countries with 
high levels of investment.  I then provide a simple model to explain how income-shifting 
– the mobility of profits from high to low tax countries – has led to lower corporate 
income tax rates and less reliance on more traditional incentives.  Conclusions follow. 
 
2. The Changing Structure of Incentives for FDI 
 Countries hoping to attract FDI have typically used tax policies. FDI is beneficial 
to capital importing countries by increasing the both the supply of capital as well as 
                                                 
1 Financing regimes refer more generally to tax policies that apply low rates of corporate tax on 
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introducing improved management and technology transferred from abroad.  As studies 
have shown, several factors influence FDI, including the size of the market, exchange 
rate controls, infrastructure, the quality of labour, political stability, and taxation.  
Common tax policies used to attract FDI include corporate income tax reductions, tax 
holidays, accelerated depreciation (including investment allowances), investment tax 
credits and preferential treatment of income such as low taxes on earnings from exports.  
De Mooij and Ederveen [2003] suggest, using meta-analysis, that the elasticity of FDI 
with respect to the host country tax rate is 3.3.  However, most studies only take into 
account only certain tax incentives such as accelerated depreciation and investment tax 
credits and rarely examine the impact of tax holidays and certain other incentives that are 
much more difficult to model and quantify.2   
 To gain some understanding of existing tax regimes used to attract FDI, I analyze 
those countries that have been most successful in attracting FDI as measured as a 
proportion of GDP (taken for the years 1997-2002).  Table 1 provides information on 15 
countries with respect to their world rank among both developed and developing 
countries in attracting FDI as well as exporting FDI to other jurisdictions. Tax variables 
are also included such the corporate income tax rate, common withholding tax rates on 
dividends and interest (especially by treaty), the availability of a special financing regime 
to attract holding companies in finance and services, tax holidays, capital cost incentives 
and foreign exchange controls.   
 As is shown in Table 1, the country with the greatest level of both inbound and 
outbound FDI – each almost 20% of GDP for 1997-2002 – is Hong Kong (which is no 
longer a developing country anymore).  For many years, it has followed tax policies that 
tend to encourage holding companies to locate in Hong Kong to serve the Asian market 
(next to Tokyo, Hong Kong has the largest stock market in Asia).  The financial sector, 
now almost one-half of GDP (Mintz and Richardson [2001]), has been encouraged by tax 
policies that keep corporate income tax rates (applied to Hong Kong source income only) 
below international norms as well as avoid levying withholding taxes on payments to 
non-residents.  While Hong Kong has no special financing regime for financial or holding 
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companies, its tax system on the whole has encouraged financial businesses to locate 
there.  Hong Kong steadfastly avoids policies that are targeted to special business 
activities although it does provide expensing for investments in machinery for many 
industries.   
Hong Kong is an example of what I call a conduit country (Mintz [2004]) with 
high levels of both inbound and outbound capital flows.  Other countries can also be 
characterized as conduit countries including Belgium-Luxembourg, Netherlands, several 
Scandinavian countries, Ireland and the United Kingdom.  These countries have tax 
structures that are quite common – relatively low corporate income taxes, often below a 
20% rate (the average is about 31% among industrialized and developing economies 
(KPMG [2004]), low or no withholding taxes with important treaty partners, exemption 
of foreign source income earned by affiliates operating abroad and little or no capital 
gains taxes.  Conduit countries are able to attract high levels of FDI because of their low 
tax rate regimes as well as the absence of foreign exchange controls.   
Hong Kong, of course, is not the only successful developing country that has 
attracted FDI as shown in Table 1.  Some countries like Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Kazakhstan, 
Bahrain and, to a lesser extent, Chile3, attract FDI to exploit rich natural resources that 
are a main source of income.  Corporate income tax rates and withholding taxes earned 
from oil or mining production tend to be high and the governments rely less on special 
preferences like tax holidays and special financing regimes.   
                                                 
3 Chile has a special high tax regime for natural resource industries.  See Ernst and Young [2004].  
Singapore has a low tax rate of 10% on foreign-source income earned by resident companies. 
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Table 1:  Top 15 Developing Countries Ranked by Sum of Outbound and Inbound  
      Foreign Direct Investment as a Percentage of GDP (1997-2001) 
Developing 
Country 
Rank1 Outbound 
FDI as % 
of GDP 
Inbound 
FDI as 
% of 
GDP 
CIT 
Rate 
% 
Non-
resident 
withholding 
tax (%)2 
Special  
Financing 
Regime3 
Tax 
Holiday 
Capital 
Cost 
Write 
Offs4 
Foreign 
Exchange
Controls 
Hong Kong 2 19.7 20.9 17.5  none none none Exp none 
Azerbaijan 6   0.0 17.9 25 10 none none Acc yes 
Singapore 9   5.4   9.8 22 Div 0 
Int 15 
yes yes (10 
yrs) 
Acc none 
Malta 12   0.1 12.4 35 None yes  no ITC yes 
Chile 13   3.2   7.8 17 Div 18 
Int 35 
yes no Acc partial 
Estonia 14   1.9   8.2 0 Div 0/265 
Int 35 
n/a none none no 
Bolivia 15   0.0   9.9 25/50 12.5 none none none no 
Seychelles 18   1.3   7.8 40 Div 0/15 
Int 0/10 
none none PR, 
Acc 
yes 
Macedonia 19   0.0   8.9 15 Div 0/15 
Int 0/10 
no Yes6 (3 
yrs) 
Acc yes 
Aruba 21   0.1   8.4 35 Div 5 
Int 0 
yes none none yes 
Kazakhstan 23   0.0   8.0 30 15 none none Acc yes 
Czech 
Republic 
24   0.1   7.8 28 Div 5/15 
Int 0/15 
none yes (10 
yrs) 
Acc none 
Jamaica 25   1.1   5.8 33.3 Div 0/15 
Int 12.5/15 
no (except 
trading) 
yes (5-
15 yrs) 
Acc none 
Malaysia 27   2.0   4.6 28 Div 0 
Int. 10/15 
yes yes (10 
yrs) 
Acc yes 
Bahrain 28   1.6   4.9 0 0 (46 for oil 
income) 
none none none none 
Source:  International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Ernst and Young [2004]. 
Notes:  
1. Rank is among all developed and developing economies.  Of top 10, developed economies include 
Belgium-Luxembourg (1), Netherlands (3), Sweden (4), Ireland (5), Denmark (7), United 
Kingdom (8), Finland (10). 
2. Withholding taxes apply to both dividends and interest payment unless otherwise noted. 
3. Either special regime or much lower tax rate on financial income, headquarter operations, holding 
companies. 
4. Exp: Expensing for qualifying assets. 
 Acc: Accelerated depreciation or investment allowance 
 ITC: Investment tax credits, including research and development. 
 PR: Preferential corporate tax rates for some activities, including export activities. 
5. Estonia does not tax income but taxes certain payments made by companies.  Dividends are 
exempt from the 26% tax rate if payments are made to non-residents with at least 20% 
participation in the Estonian establishment and do not reside in a low tax country. 
6. Macedonia’s “tax holidays” are generally similar to investment incentives in that income that is 
exempt is limited to the investments made by the firm. 
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 Several countries besides Hong Kong in Table 1, however, have established 
financing regime tax policies to attract foreign investment.  Singapore, Chile, Malta and 
Malaysia have created special regimes for financial income or holding companies.  In 
some cases, like Estonia, Macedonia and Bahrain, the low or no corporate income taxes 
as well as zero withholding taxes encourages FDI as well.  Those countries with the most 
significant outbound investment – Singapore, Chile and Malaysia – have clearly used 
their special financing regimes to encourage holding and financial companies.  However, 
in the case of Malaysia, stringent currency controls limit its ability to attract FDI.   
 What is striking about these high-FDI countries is that tax holidays are limited to 
only one-third of the cases – Singapore, Macedonia4, Czech Republic, Jamaica and 
Malaysia, only one-third of the countries involved.5  Tax holidays, so common among 
developing countries, are not particularly important to many high-FDI countries.  
However, the holidays have been important for financial companies operating in some 
jurisdictions like Singapore. 
 Most of the high-FDI countries use accelerated depreciation, investment tax 
credits and other preferential treatment for capital investments.  Estonia and Bahrain does 
not provide fast writeoffs for capital investments since they have no general corporate 
income tax. Bolivia and Aruba also do not provide incentives for capital investment. 
 To sum up, the fifteen high-FDI countries have either corporate income tax rates 
below 20% or special financing regimes (ten cases), withholding taxes below 5% with 
major partners (nine cases), tax holidays (five cases) and fast writeoffs for capital costs 
(11 cases).   
 
3. Why Tax Incentives are being restructured? 
 Tax incentives are intended to increase capital investment and generate economic 
growth.  However, their utility is limited by their effectiveness, complexity and fiscal 
cost.  To capture the notion that tax reforms may be composed of rate reductions rather 
than accelerated depreciation, investment allowances and tax credits, I will introduce a 
                                                 
4 Macedonia tax holidays follow a pattern established by Bulgaria recently in exempting profits up to 
amounts invested in capital for a limited number of years.  In other words, the incentive is more like an 
investment allowance than a tax holiday. 
5 Aruba had tax holidays and offshore financing regimes that were recently abolished, January 1, 2003.  
The Aruba Exempt Company (AVV) does not pay profit tax. 
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simple model to analyze the benefits of each type of reform.  Tax holidays are left to a 
discussion below since they are more complicated to consider than simple rate 
reductions. 
 
A Simple Income-Shifting Model with Capital Investment 
 Suppose an economy is composed of two sectors – domestic firms with capital 
investment equal to k, financed by a fixed supply of savings provided by entrepreneurs, 
and foreign multinationals with capital investment equal to K.  Output produced by a 
domestic firm is f[k] and by a subsidiary of the multinational F[K], both strictly concave 
production functions (although given the fixity of k, output in the domestic sector is also 
fixed).    
 The multinational finances its capital investments in the capital importing country 
with offshore debt, D, and equity equal to K-D.  In this model, financial transactions are 
used to shift income out of the jurisdiction, whereby the debt owners (which could be the 
multinational) are assumed not to pay tax on offshore debt interest that is provided to the 
subsidiary.6  The international cost of equity finance is r and the cost of debt finance is i= 
r+c[D]/D, where c is the total attendant agency and bankruptcy cost of debt provided by 
the offshore lender (c is a function that is strictly convex in D).   
 The government taxes both domestic and multinational companies at the same 
rate, t, on profits net of debt financing costs (domestic firms have no debt finance by 
assumption).  An investment tax credit equal to the rate x is provided to both domestic 
and multinational firms.  Note it is assumed that the capital importer cannot discriminate 
between domestic and multinational firms under tax policy because treaties prevent it (or 
alternatively it is not practical to do so in real life).   
 Domestic and foreign multinational after-tax profits are equal to the following 
respectively: 
(1) Πd = (1-t)f[k] + xk 
(2) Πf = (1-t){F[K]-iD) + xK 
It is assumed that 0≤D≤K due to financial constraints. 
                                                 
6 In principle, the offshore lender could be owned by the multinational. Bankruptcy and agency costs 
remain relevant to operations. 
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The optimal capital and debt decisions for the multinational are determined as follows 
(the domestic firm’s investment is fixed by supply): 
(3) F’(1-t) = r  (investment in K) 
(4) (r+c’)(1-t) = r (debt decision) 
Note for an interior decision for debt, we require that the tax benefit of interest 
deductibility to be offset by the marginal resource cost of debt finance.  We also note the 
following comparative static effects: 
(5) ∂K/∂t = F’/(1-t)F” <0 and ∂K/∂x = -1/(1-t)F” >0 
(6) ∂D/∂t = i/c” > 0  and ∂D∂/x = 0  
The responsiveness of investment and debt finance depends on the respective second 
derivatives of the production and debt cost functions as expected.  In Mintz and Smart 
[2004], multinationals can finance capital internally without cost, thereby implying that 
c”=0 so that the multinational would be either fully debt or equity financed. 
The government’s revenues from both types of firms is the following: 
(7) T = t{f[k] + F[K] – iD} –x(k+K) 
The government is assumed to maximize the weighted average of domestic-owned 
after-tax profits and tax revenues whereby the latter is multiplied by the (fixed) shadow 
cost of public funds, λ (>1): 
(8) W =  Πd  + λT 
 The government maximizes welfare choosing t and x.  Using the first-order 
conditions (3 and 4), we obtain the following optimal solutions for the profit tax rate and 
investment tax credit respectively: 
(9) t ={(1-1/λ)f+F-rD-c}/{-(F’+x)∂K/∂t +(r+c’)∂D/∂t} > 0 
(10) x = {(1-1/λ)k+K}/{tF’-1}∂K/∂x < 0 if tF’< 1  
 The optimal profit rate is positive: the numerator is positive so long as profits are 
positive and the denominator is also positive given that capital demand declines and 
leverage rises with profit taxation as shown in the numerator.  Clearly, the optimal tax 
rate is lower the more sensitive the tax base – capital investment and income-shifting 
through debt responds greater to an increase in the profit rate (the base shrinks with a 
higher tax rate).   
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 The optimal investment tax credit is negative if the cost of the credit is more than 
any profits taxes generated by additional capital investment (otherwise the credit would 
be positive if the converse holds).  In other words, the investment tax credit, when 
negative, is a tax on capital assets. 
 Optimal tax rates therefore will depend on the elasticity of the tax bases.  If debt 
finance is very sensitive to tax changes (as determined by c”), then the optimal profit tax 
rate is low due to income-shifting.  It would further imply, therefore, that the government 
would rely on capital taxes to generate revenues from businesses.7  If capital investment 
is very sensitive to changes in tax rates, then both the profit tax rate and investment tax 
credit rate (capital tax rate) will be low.   
 Note further that the greater the importance of the domestic sector (as indicated 
by f and k), the higher will be the profit tax rate and investment tax credit. 
 To sum up, the above simple model comes to the following conclusions: 
• Greater income-shifting by multinationals through debt finance pushes 
corporate tax rate down and reduces the incentive to use investment tax credits 
(or increase the incentive to use capital taxes). 
• Countries with a small multinational sector will be less concerned with 
income-shifting and thereby less willing to cut corporate taxes.   
Some recent evidence has been provided suggesting that income-shifting (whether 
through financial transactions or transfer pricing), has become increasingly important 
(Jog and Tang [2001], Mintz and Smart [2004], Grubert and Slemrod [1998] and Hines 
[1999] and Bartelsman and Beetsma [2000]).  Given the significant increase in FDI, 
particular in the late 1990s, one can understand why governments have become more 
concerned about income-shifting in general in designing their corporate tax systems. 
 
What About Tax Holidays 
 As discussed above, countries with high levels of FDI do not use tax holidays – 
yet with a lower profit tax rate for qualifying years at the inception of the project, it 
                                                 
7 Capital taxes, however, can be avoided by leasing arrangements if the tax is applied only assets owned by 
companies operating in the jurisdiction. 
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would seem the tax holiday would be a popular measure to encourage FDI as well as 
combat income-shifting since tax rates are kept low. 
 As sensible this might be – and some countries like Singapore and Malaysia cling 
to tax holidays – the tax holiday is inferior as an incentive compared to low corporate tax 
rate regimes provided on a permanent basis.  There are several reasons for this as 
reviewed in Mintz [1990].   
 First, tax holidays are only given to some firms – new ones entering a market – 
rather than all companies operating in the jurisdictions.  The tax holidays then create a 
competitive advantage to new companies to the detriment of existing companies that have 
taken a longer run view of the economy.  Governments are pressured to provide other 
incentives so that non-holiday companies can compete with tax holiday firms.  The 
corporate tax system develops a “Swiss cheese” look over time with more distortions and 
complexities accompanied by eroding tax revenues.  Given the importance of income-
shifting, it would seem that a broad-based approach to corporate rate reductions would 
make more sense. 
 Second, identifying “new” from older companies can be a mug’s game.  
Companies may close down at the end of the holiday to mysteriously appear as new 
companies to qualify for new holidays.  This leads to not only extending holidays for 
longer periods of time through churning but heightens the distortions arising from 
competitive advantages given to holiday companies. 
 Third, the revenue cost of holidays can be quite substantial without necessarily 
providing substantial incentives for business investment.  If companies must write down 
capital assets for depreciation purposes and are unable to claim interest deductions, 
unadjusted for inflation, during the holiday, they could pay quite significant taxes on 
income earned after a holiday is completed.  In the case of Bangladesh and Malaysia in 
the late 1980s, for example, tax holiday effective tax rates on investments were even 
above the effective tax rates in the post-holiday period (Mintz [1990]).  Further, with debt 
financing and transfer pricing, companies could shift income from non-holiday to 
associated holiday companies to shelter income from taxation.  The holiday is blunted in 
its effect by such tax avoidance practices. 
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 Given these problems with tax holidays, it would seem natural for governments to 
seek other low-rate incentives to encourage foreign direct investment.  Some countries, 
like Bulgaria, Hungary (in the early 1990s) and Macedonia have actually abandoned tax 
holidays in favour of low corporate tax rate regimes.   
 
4. Conclusions  
 Countries receiving substantial foreign direct investment are relying less on tax 
holidays than on low corporate tax rate regimes.  Although it is still popular to provide 
accelerated depreciation, investment allowances or other incentives for capital 
investments, the most innovative incentives in the 1990s have been to lower corporate 
income tax rates sharply.   
 Theoretically, sharply reduced corporate tax rates would be predicted from a 
model in which corporate profit tax bases are more elastic with respect to changes in 
corporate tax rates.  Businesses are able to shift profits easily from high-tax to low-tax 
jurisdictions without moving people or machines.  As shown theoretically, if anything, 
incentives directed at capital costs would be reduced, or alternatively, countries would 
rely on asset-based taxes to raise revenues if such taxes are less susceptible to tax 
avoidance.  Empirical work is needed to analyse in more detail the effect of tax incentives 
on foreign direct investment.  
 The implications of the changing structure of tax incentives for FDI are important 
to both domestic and international tax policy.   
Domestic policies would need to be adjusted when business tax rates are kept low, 
in order to ensure that corporate and personal taxes on income are integrated.  When the 
corporate income tax rate is brought below the top personal tax rate, dividend and capital 
gains taxes paid by individuals are preferentially set so that individuals pay the same tax 
(corporate and personal) regardless of whether the income derived is in the form of 
dividends, capital gains or interest and other payments that are deductible from corporate 
income but fully taxed at the individual level.    
 On the other hand, international tax policies for a country will be significantly 
influenced by new low-corporate tax regimes, specifically with respect to the incentive to 
undertake cross-border investments rather than investing domestically.  As discussed in 
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Mintz [2004], the effect of special financing regimes is to provide opportunities for 
multinationals to invest in foreign jurisdictions with tax-efficient financing compared to 
domestic companies.  Too much cross-border investment is encouraged since 
international tax regimes are not neutral between domestic and cross-border investments.  
This creates some difficult issues for international tax co-ordination, which is a subject 
going beyond the thrust of this paper. 
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